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ABSTRACT 
Parties to a contract often must engage in expenditures 
prior to the performance of the contract to either prepare for or 
make use of the performance of the contract. Legal institutions 
provide for contract enforcement either by specifically enforcing 
contractually specified actions or by requiring that the breacher 
pay the breachee an amount of money called damages. This paper 
analyzes the impact of varying the enforcement institution on the 
incentives to rely. An unambiguous ranking of specific performance 
and five damage measures is obtained in terms of efficiency of the 
reliance decision. 
EFFICIENT RELIANCE AND CONTRACT REMEDIES* 
William P. Rogerson 
INTRODUCTION 
The essential element of a contract is time: parties 
promise at some earlier date to perform specified actions at some 
later date. There are three broad classes of reasons people might 
want to enter such an arrangement. First, at the earlier date 
events out of control of either of the parties may still be uncertain. 
A contract can be a futures contract, transferring this exogenous 
uncertainty to those more willing to bear it. Second, at the earlier 
date events which can be affected by one of the parties may be 
subjectively uncertain to the other party. A contract can remove 
this endogenous uncertainty. The third reason is not associated 
with allocation of exogenous or removal of endogenous risk: it also 
applies to risk neutral people. Tfe,value of performance at the 
later date to one of the people might be much larger if he engases 
in some other activity ahead of time. For example, a rock promoter 
hiring a band can increase the value of the exchange to himself by 
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advertising before the concert date. Expenses incurred prior to 
an exchange in anticipation of the exchange are called reliance. 
A party to an exchange may be unwilling to engage in any reliance 
at all without some assurances that the other party will exchange 
at a previously agreed price. By this it is not meant that the 
relier needs the variance of the price of exchange reduced. This 
falls under the second reason for contracting. Rather, he requires 
that its expected value be raised. If negotiations occur after the 
relier engages in reliance, he may be in a very weak negotiating 
position since he will lose money unless the other party to the 
exchange performs. The relier's expected return to reliance may be 
quite low or even negative in the absence of a contract which the 
relier can negotiate prior to relying. 
In the extreme case, this may mean that no exchange occurs, 
although both parties could have benefited from it. More generally, 
the relier may engage in less reliance than if he were assured of a 
particular price of exchange , and even though the exchange occurs, 
it does not generate nearly the aggregate value that it might have. 
Both parties could have been made better off had there been some 
manner of assuring one another's performance. A contract can do this. 
I will call this third function of contracts "assuring performance." 
Were it not for exogenous uncertainty and transactions 
and information costs, there would be no problem to analyze. In 
this case, a law that all contracts must be honored would induce 
efficient behavior. For the case of no exogenous uncertainty, 
parties to the potential exchange enter a contract if and only if 
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a price exists which makes them both better off. The parties then 
maximize their own return by choosing levels of reliance which also 
maximize the aggregate value. 
However, the case where exogenous uncertainty exists is 
not so simple. As examples of exogenous uncertainty, the cost of 
production may depend on the amount of rain that falls, or the buyer 
may be purchasing the good for resale and is uncertain of the future 
price. In this case, the efficient solution typically involves 
some reliance but no exchange if the cost of the seller rises too 
high or the value to the buyer drops too low. A simple legal 
provision that all contracts must be enforced does not induce this 
efficient behavior if the contract simply specifies that an exchange 
shall occur. Instead , the contract has to specify the complete set 
of contingencies and whether the exchange shall occur or not under 
each one. 
In a world of zero transaction costs and costless gathering 
and processing of information, this is the "ideal" solution; parties 
to the contract guarantee that the exchange produces the maximum 
aggregate value and the negotiated �rice divides it between the two. 
However, drafting and, particularly, negotiating exhaustive contracts 
is expensive. The list of possible contingencies could be almost 
endless. Furthermore, a number of the contingencies may be internal 
to one of the parties and very difficult to verify. This would allow 
the possibility of misrepresentation. For example, a seller ' s  
costs might rise enough that he would not want to exchange even though 
the contract specifies that he must; if his production process was 
4 
complex he might easily be able to argue that costs had risen even 
more so that the exchange should not take place according to the 
contract. The alternative would be to only specify contingencies 
external to the firm instead of using the cost variable. However, 
to do this both parties would essentially have to agree on what the 
firm's production function was; this is clearly an extremely costly 
process. In summary, to arrive at an efficient contract by this 
method would essentially amount to an exchange of all information 
and then joint calculation of an optimum. This process sacrifices 
the low cost, low information, and incentive-compatible properties 
of more decentralized decision making processes. Of course , some 
contingencies are important enough and easily verifiable enough 
that they are included in contracts; however , a large mass of 
contingencies are generally left unspecified in contracts. 
How, then, does a contract which simply specifies that an 
exchange will occur provide assurances of performance for the 
relier? The law could still (and does at times) provide for specific 
performance -- the relier could have the right to force the breacher 
to perform. More typically, a damage measure is embedded in the law 
which provides that a party to a contract who breaches must pay the 
breachee an amount of money called damages. In either case, the 
institutions tend to provide assurances of performance by allowing 
the relier a private return to his reliance even in the event that 
breach is the efficient course of action. That is, the relier is 
insured to some extent against the possibility that his reliance 
may have no social return. As with many kinds of insurance , a moral 
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hazard is created. In this case, the nature of the moral hazard 
is that the relier tends to over-rely. By solving the problem of 
under-reliance due to the lack of assurances of performance, ,we 
create a problem of over-reliance due to moral hazard. 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the amount of 
moral hazard generated by different damage measures and by specific 
performance. The formal analysis is done in a particularly simple 
environment. I assume that the buyer and seller only specify in 
their contract that an exchange will occur at a fixed price. This 
is the situation encountered under high transaction and information 
costs. Only the buyer makes a reliance decision and only the seller's 
cost of production and the size of third party offers to purchase are 
subject to uncertainty at the time of contracting. The participants 
are risk neutral to avoid muddying the analysis of efficient reliance 
and breach with that of efficient allocation of exogenous risk or 
removal of endogenous risk. I assume that both participants measure 
the value of the good to themselves in dollars. Together with the 
preceding assumptions, this means that participants will measure 
the value of a contract to themselves in expected value of dollars. 
If both parties are firms this assumption is fairly natural. See 
Rogerson (1980) for a discussion of this case where one of the 
parties is a consumer. This means that we can simply add the value 
of the contract to both players to obtain an efficiency index. 
A contract with a higher aggregate value is more efficient. Notice 
that the buyer and seller would always choose a more efficient 
institution over a less efficient one because in the former case 
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they could negotiate a price which would make them both better off. 
Shavell (1978) was the first person to point out that 
damage measures might distort the reliance decision. The 
analysis of this paper owes a debt to that of Shavell, but is 
substantially different for the following reasons. First, 
the agents are allowed to negotiate away potentially inefficient 
breach behavior at the given level of reliance. Modelling this 
process requires that the relier form expectations over payoffs 
resulting form negotiations that will occur at a future time. 
(This same model is also used to formally demonstrate that 
reliance is in general too small without assurances of performance.) 
Second, third party offers to purchase are considered separately 
from costs of production. This allows a distinction to be drawn 
between restitution and expectation damages. As well, it allows 
a clearer picture of the information requirements for the various 
institutions. Third, a distinction is made between the case where 
a market for substitute performance exists and the case where no 
market for substitute performance exists. The ranking of 
institutions is substantially affected by this factor. Fourth, 
liquidated damages, restitution damages, and specific 
performance are considered, as well as expectation damages and 
reliance damages. 
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II THE MODEL 
The buyer of the good intends to use the good as an input 
in some production process and to bell the result or to consume the 
good himself. In either case he can engage in reliance, r. The 
value of the good to him is then v(r). Therefore , the net value 
of the good to him is 
v(r) - r. (1) 
If the buyer engages in reliance and no exchange takes place , he 
may be able to obtain some scrap value for the reliance or , if 
he is not so lucky , may have to pay a disposal cost. Let v(r) 
denote this amount. Therefore the value of no exchange to him is: 
v(r) - r. 
Assume that: 
(i) v and v are defined and continuous over [O , �), 
(ii) 
I I 
v(r) - r has a unique global maximum at re' 
(iii) v(r) v(r) is nondecreasing, 
(iv) v(r) - r is decreasing. 
Assumption (ii) means that even if we are sure the good will be 
(3) 
produced and exchanged, eventually some optimal level of reliance 
is reached; past some point the net return to reliance begins to 
(2) 
decline. The assumption of uniqueness is for technical convenience. 
Assumption (iii) means that engaging in reliance for its primary 
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purpose is at least as profitable as engaging in reliance for its 
scrap value. Assumption (iv) means that engaging in reliance solely 
to sell it as scrap is unprofitable; the buyer would only engage 
in reliance if there were some hope of purchasing the good. Note 
in particular that no convexity assumptions need to be made. 
The seller produces the good at a cost of c. This cost 
varies randomly; the realization of the random variable is unknown 
at the time r is chosen . Let k be the best other offer that the 
seller of the good receives for his good between the time the 
'contract is entered and the time that the exchange is supposed 
to occur. If a market for the good exists, k is the market price 
at the time of exchange. The realization of k is unknown at the 
time the contract is entered and the reliance decision is made. 
Assume without loss of generality that c and k are defined over 
the probability space (0 , 1] with Lebesgue measure. Let 8
denote an element of (0 , 1] . Assume that c is always non-negative 
and k is bounded from below. This simply means that it costs ,at 
least zero to produce the good and the market price is bounded from 
below. 
If the good in question is not unique and the buyer of 
the good intends to use the good as an input in some production 
process and to sell the result we might expect that a rise in 
price, k, would also cause a rise in the price in the market for 
the buyer's output. As a consequence v(r) would also rise. In 
this case, interpret k as the net increase in price in the input 
market after the price increase in the output market is accounted 
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for. Therefore, the same mathematics applies to this more 
complex case. For ease of exposition I will address the simpler 
case where v is not random. 
The buyer and seller negotiate a �ontract which states 
that exchange will occur at a price, p. Six types of contract 
enforcement institutions will be considered. Specific performance 
is the simplest. The buyer has the right to demand that the 
exchange occur at p. Under reliance damages, the breacher must 
compensate the relier for all non-recoverable reliance expenditures.
Therefore the seller must pay the buyer r -;(r) if the seller breaches.
The definition '.of expectation damages is more complex. 
This is the damage measure currently in general use in the courts. 
Its intention is to put the relier in the same financial position 
as if the contract were carried out. Suppose first that a competitive 
market exists where substitute performance can be purchased. If 
the buyer uses the good himself he would receive 
v(r) - r - p. 
 
However , if he sold to the highest alternative buyer he would 
receive 
;(r) - r - p + k. 
(4) 
(5) 
Therefore , assuring the buyer of a level of profits equal to that 
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he would have received had performance occurred amounts to 
assuring him the maximum of (4) and (5). If the breaching seller 
pays the buyer 
k - p 
the buyer can decide which of (4) or (5) to receive by deciding 
whether or not to purchase substitute performance. 
(6) 
In many cases , however, there is no market for substitute 
performance. The most obvious case is where the good in question 
is unique. However, at least two other cases also arise. Sometimes 
there are many types of the good but the reliance is only useful for 
one type. For example, a rock promoter could hire any band but 
once he has hired .Abba and advertised that Abba is coming and sold 
tickets to an Abba concert, some other rock band cannot provide 
substitute performance. Time is sometimes a crucial variable. If 
the seller breaches too close to the date of performance and it 
is crucial that the performance occur precisely at that time, no 
substitute performance may be obtainable on such short notice. In 
the extreme, the breacher may not indicate that he is breaching 
until the moment of expected performance. Notice that when time 
plays this role specific performance is not a possibility. 
Expectation damages when no market for substitute 
performance exists are defined by 
v(r) - v(r) - p (7) 
When these are paid to the buyer (who sells his reliance for v(r)) 
the buyer's net return is 
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v(r) - r - p (8) 
I 
which is what he would have received had he received the good 
and used it himself. 
This definition of expectation damages for the 
case of no market for substitute performance is the one the 
courts generally use. However, when k > v - v , this rule may result 
in the situation where the seller breaches and sells the good to 
the third party for k. The seller's net profit over the case where 
he sells to the original buyer is k - v(r) - v(r). If one believed 
that the original buyer could also have resold the item for k to 
the third party, then protecting his expectation interest requires 
that damages be the maximum of (7) and k - p, where k is now the 
price that the breaching seller sold to a third party for. 
I will call this variant of expectation damages ideal restitution··�. 
damages. 
I call this variant "ideal" restitution da=g:cs bcc<lui::c 
although it will be seen to possess good properties, .the courts could 
I I probably not administer it. To d� so, the courts would have to be 
able to determine what the highest third party offer to purchase 
was. Such a process would generally be prohibitively expensive and 
error-prone, if not impossible. I will call a more feasible variant 
of this damage measure restitution damages. Under restitution damages 
the seller pays expectation damages if he elects to sell to no one. 
However, if he elects to sell to a third party he pays the maximum 
of k - p and expectation damages. Note that under both ideal 
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restitution damages and restitution damages the seller never has 
an incentive to sell to a third party. 
Liquidated damages is the last damage measure that will 
be considered. Under this measure, parties specify in the contract 
a sum of money which the seller must pay the buyer in the event of 
breach. 
III A MARKET FOR SUBSTITUTE PERFORMANCE EXISTS 
We measure the efficiency of the outcome by suillllling the 
value to the buyer and seller. Three decisions affect the aggregate 
value generated--the amount of reliance engaged in by the buyer; whether 
or not the seller produces the good; and whether the buyer consumes the 
good produced by the seller , some other good or no good at all. Let P1 be 
those values of 8 such that the seller produces the good and the 
buyer consumes it or some other good. Let P2 be those values of 
8 such that the seller produces the good and the original 
buyer does not consume a good. Let P3 be those values of 8 
such that the seller does not produce the good and the buyer 
buys a good from someone else. Let P4 be all other values of 9. 
Then the aggregate expected value of the exchange can be written as 
a function of r, P1 , P2 , P3
, and P4. Let A denote Lebesgue measure. 
Let F be the function determining aggregate value of the exchange. 
F(r , P1 ,P2 ,P3 ,P4) f v(r) - r - c(8)dApl 
+ I v(r) - r + k(8 ) - c(S)dA 
p2 
Proposition 1 :  
+ I v (r)  - r - k(6) dA 
p3 
+ J v (r) - rdA 
P4 
Define the following four sets : 
Pf (r) {6 C (6) 2_ k(6) A V (r) - V (r)  � k(6 ) }  
_ P� (r) {6 C (6 )  2_ k(6) A v (�)  - v(r) < k(6)t 
P�(r) {6 c (6 )  > k(6) A V (r)  - v(r) � k(6) }  
Pt Cr)  {6 c (6 )  > k(6) a v(r)  - v(r) < k(6 ) }
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(11 )  
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
Then for any r E [ 0 , 00 ) , Pf (r) , P� (r)1P3 (r) , and Pz (r) uniquely 
(up to inclusion or exclusion of sets of measure zero) maximize 
F ( r , P1 , P2 , P3 , P4) .
Proof :  
Obvious . D 
The intuition of Proposition 1 is clear . I t  is efficient 
to produce if and only if the cost of production is less than or 
equal to the market price. It is efficient to consume if and only 
if the marginal benefit from consumption is greater than or equal 
to the market pri ce .  Define f (r)  as the function yielding an 
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aggregate value for r when P1 , P2 , P3 , and P4 are chosen optimally . 
f (r) F(r,Pf (r)�P� (r) , P� (r) , Pt Cr) ) (15) 
Proposition 2 : 
The function f (r)  is continuous on [0 , 00) . Furthermore 
f (re) > f (r) for all r > re . Therefore f achieves a global maximum 
and all such global maximums occur in [O,re] .
Proof : 
See Appendix. o 
Therefore an optimum level of reliance exists . Let R 
be the s et of all such levels of reliance. (The maximum may not 
be unique. )  By referring to the proof it is easy to see that re 
will generally not be an element of R. This is true , for example, 
if f is differentiable. Loosely speaking, the element re will be
in R when v exhibits a large kink at re . The most interesting 
observation to be made about the case where a market for substitute 
performance exists is that in the absence of any contract institution, 
the buyer and seller will act optimally . 
Proposition 3 :  
When a market for substitute performance exists, the 
buyer and seller act optimally in the absence of a contract 
institution . 
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Proof:  
See Appendix. 
The proof is simple . The buyer will consume the good if and only 
if v (r) - v (r) 2:_ k; otherwise he is better off reselling it . The 
0 
seller will produce the good if and only if his costs of production 
are less than or equal to the market price . The only real question 
is whether the buyer relies optimally. He does so b ecause he 
experiences all the marginal social costs and benefits when he 
varies r .  Therefore r isk neutral par ties do not need a contract 
institution when a market exist s .  There i s  no need for the relier 
to b e  assured of performance for optimal reliance to occur 
b ecause his negotiating position is not damaged when he relies . 
He can purchase at the market price regardless of his level of 
reliance. 
Even though no contract institution is needed to assure 
performance in the case where a market for substitute performance 
exists , it is still interesting to determine how much moral hazard 
exists , because a contract institu�ion may be in use for one of 
I 
the other two r easons outlined in the introduction. Expectation 
damages is easiest . The buyer and seller consume and produce 
optimally ( i . e. , the buyer consumes if and only if v(r) - v(r ) > k 
and the seller produces if and only if c < k) . The buyer can view 
himself as always receiving the good at price p .  (If the seller 
honors ,  this is automatically so .  If the seller breaches , the buyer 
receives enough lllDney so he need pay only p more dollars to purchase 
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the good.  If the buyer breaches, he must pay enough money so it  
would still cost him in  total p dollars to buy the good or the 
market . )  The buyer relies optimally in this case . Specific 
performance is equivalent to expectation damages when a market 
for substitute performance exists because the seller will purchase 
a good on the market to fulfill his contract obligation if c > k. 
Therefore specific performance also results in efficient behavior . 
Proposition 4 states these result s .  
Proposition 4: 
When a market for substitute performance exists , the 
buyer and seller act optimally using either expectation damages or 
specific p erformance. 
Proo f :  
See Appendix . 0 
Therefore,  when a market for substitute performance exists , 
most of the problems of concern in this paper vanish . The relier 
needs no assurances of performance to rely efficiently. The 
institutions of expectation damages and specific performance 
produce no moral hazard and result in efficient allocation of 
resources . In the next s ection it will be seen that both 
problems exist in the absence of a market for substitute performance . 
IV. NO MARKET FOR SUBSTITUTE PERFORMANCE EXISTS
A. Efficient Behavior 
Once again we measure the1 efficiency of the outcome by 
summing the value to the buyer and seller . The same three 
decisions affect the aggregate value generated , except that now 
the buyer does not have the option o·f consuming some other sub-
stitute good if the seller breaches . Let P1 be those values of
S such that the good is produced and the buyer consumes it.  
Let P2 be those values of 8 such that the good is produced 
and a third party consumes i t .  Let P3 be those values of 8 
such that the good is not produced . Then the aggregate value of 
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the exchange can b e  written as a function of r ,  P1 , P2 and P3 . When 
possible, I will re-use the same symbols that were used for the 
corresponding expressions in section III since the analysis is 
very similar . iet F denote the aggregate expected value of an 
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Pf (r) {8 c (8 )  2 v (r )  - � (r)  "v (r ) - ; (r) � k(8) } (17) 
P! (r) = {8 c (S )  2 k(8) "k(8)  � v (r) - � (r) } (18) 
P! (r) {8  c (8 )  > v (r)  - v (r) " c ( 8 )  > k(8 ) } (19) 
Then for any r E [ O , � ) , Pf (r) , P! (r) , · and· P! (r) uniquely
(up to inclusion or exclusion of sets of measure zero) maximize 
F (r , P1 , P2 , P3) .
Proo f :  
The proof i s  similar to that of Proposition 1 .  0 
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 5. 
exchange. FIGURE I 
F ( r , P1 , P2 , P3) = JP v (r)  - r - c (S )dA 1 
+ J v (r) - r + k(8}_ - c (S )dA 
p2 
+ J v(r) - rdA 
p3 
Proposition 5: 
Define the following three sets : 
(16) 
AGGREGATE RETURN TO RELIANCE 
8 is such that 
the largest of 
{v - v , c , k} is 
v - v 
k 
c 
Joint 
value 
v - r - c 
k - v - r - c 
v - r 
If 8 is such that the most profitable course of action for the buyer 
and seller is to honor the contract, then reliance is useful up to re 
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However,  if 9 is such that the most  profitable course of action is 
for a third party to consume the good or for no production to oocur 
then, ex post,  reliance always exl;rl.bits a negative return. Therefore, 
no matter what happens , it is never profitable to rely past re . 
Define f (r) as the function yielding aggregate value for r when 
P1 , P2 , and P3 are chosen optimally. 
f(r)  • F (r,Pi (r);P..! (r)•PS (r)); 
Let R be the set of values for r which maximize f .  
Proposition 6�  
(20) 
The function f (r) is continuous on [0 , 00 ) . Furthermore, 
f (r ) > f (r) for all r > r • Therefore, f achieves a global rnaxi�un e e 
and all such global maximums occur in [0, re] .
Proof : 
The proof is similar to that of Propsition 2 .  o 
I I I Therefore an optimum level of reliance exists . Let R 
b e  the s et of all optimal levels of reliance. As for Proposition 2, 
re will generally not be an element of R unless v exhibits a large
kink at re . 
B. Negotiations 
In the analysis that follows, it is necessary on four 
20 
separate occasions to model the process by which the buyer forms 
expectations over a future uncertain payoff to be determined by 
negotiations between the buyer and seller. It seems most economical 
to present a model of this process at the outset. The four s ituations 
where the buyer needs to form these expectations in order to make his 
reliance decision are as follows. The first instance occurs if no 
contract is entered . The buyer may still choose to rely to some 
extent and then negotiate a price with the seller at the time of 
exchange. The other three instances occur when a contract institution 
would produce inefficient breach behavior conditional on the level of 
reliance. It seems likely that a negotiation involving a side payment 
would remove any such inefficiency. This situation occurs for specific 
performance,  reliance damages ,  and restitution damages . (I deal restitu-
tion damages , expectation damages, and liquidated damages result in 
efficient behavior conditional on the level of reliance without 
post contract negotiations . )  
In all cases, there is a natural upper and lower bound 
on the size of the side payment determined by what the agents could 
secure for themselves in the absence of cooperative action. The 
agents can therefore be viewed as essentially negotiating over how 
to divide up a sum of money the difference between the upper and 
lower bound. I assume that there exists a number a in the interval 
[O , l ]  such that the buyer expects to receive a of the sum of money. 
The number a is thus an index of negotiating strength . As a grows 
larger the buyer feels that he will secure more of the rent from any 
negotiation . When the analysis of the subsequent sections is read 
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it will become clear that it is only necessary for the buyer to 
use the same value for a within each case.  (Recall there are four 
cases. ) The buyer may use a differ1ent value of a for each of the
four cases and all propositions are still true . The same symbol , a ,
i s  used in all four cases for notational convenience . 
Under the assumption that post-contract negotiations always 
occur to remove inefficiencies at the given reliance level the size 
of a reflects the relier ' s  expectations of his strength in the 
upcoming negotiations. However ,  these negotiations may not always 
result in efficient behavior due to bluffing or poor information, 
for example .  As well , these negotiations are costly and thus consume 
some of the returns they generate . In this more general context 
a lower value of a can be generated by a higher expected negotiation 
cost or higher probability of arriving at no agreement. I will 
formally refer to a merely as an indicator of negotiating strength 
for ease o f  exposition. 
This model of negotiations performs two functions"-in·:the 
later analysis. First, it establishes that the expected payoff from 
negotiations to the relier depends flli his financial position in the
absence of cooperation. This latter variable is of course affected 
by his reliance decision. Second, it establishes that the first 
effect is manifested in a smooth, regular fashion. In particular, 
if the buyer can increase his expected return in the absence of 
cooperation , he will also increase his return from negotiations. 
When the seller has an incentive to make an inefficient 
breach or sales decision at the given level of reliance, the buyer's 
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return to reliance is the same if we assume that no post-contract 
negotiations occur or if we assume that post-contract negotiations 
occur but that the buyer receives none of the increase in j o int 
returns (i. e . , a equals 0). However , these two cases are not equally
efficient . At least when there are no transactions costs and where 
post-contract negotiations always produce agreement , the case of 
post-contract negotiations and a equals zero produces a j o int return 
of f (r) , while the case of no post-contract negotiations produces 
a smaller j oint return. Therefore, to compare efficiency of insti-
tutions by comparing the values f assumes under the reliance decisions 
they generate, requires the assumption that post-contract negotiations 
occur to the same extent and at the same cost under all the institutions . 
C .  Behavior with No Contract 
If no contract is entered , the buyer must first choose 
a level of reliance . The realization o f  8 then occurs and the 
buyer and seller negotiate a price to exchange at, if they exchange . 
The negotiated price must always be greater than or equal to the 
maximum of c (8)  and k(8)  and less than or equal to v (r) - v(r) . 
If the price was b elow c ( 8 ) , the seller would find it more profitable 
to not produce.  If  it was below k(8)  the seller would find it more 
profitable to sell to the third party. If it was above v(r) - v (r) , 
the buyer would be better off simply be selling his reliance for 
scrap . Therefore, in terms of the framework in Section B ,  the buyer 
expects to exchange if and only if 
max{c (8) , k (8 ) } .:::. v(r) - v (r) (21) 
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in which case he expects to receive 
ct (v (r) - r - max{c (8) , k (8 ) } )  + (1 - a) (; (r) - r) . (22) 
Let b (r,ll)  be his expected return from reliance, r ,  given his 
subj ective expectations , a .  
b (r ,a) J {a (v (r) - r - max{c(8) , k(8 ) } )
Pf (r) 
+ (1 - a) (;(r) - r)} dA
+ f ;(r) - rdA . P*( r ) UP*(r)2 3 
Proposition 7 shows that the reliance decision i s ,  in 
(23)  
g eneral , too  small . Furthermore, the extent to which the reliance 
decision is inefficient depends in a monotoni c  fashion on how confi-
dent the buyer is of his negotiating streng th .  If the buyer 
has absolutely no confidence in his negotiating strength, he 
engages in no reliance . This may mean that no exchange ever takes 
I I 
place . .As the buyer ' s  confidence increases , his reliance decision 
grows until , finally , if he expects to receive the maximum possibl e 
in all negotiation situations , he relies efficiently . Furthermore, 
not only his level of rel iance but also its effici ency grow 
monotonically with his confidence level . (This is true even 
though f may not be monotonically increasing in r over [ O , r  ) . )e 
Comparison of Figure 1, which diagrams the aggregate returns 
to reliance, and Figure 2 , which diagrams the buyer ' s  returns to 
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reliance under no contract provides intuition into these results . 
FIGURE 2 
BUYER' S RETURN TO RELIANCE UNDER NO CONTRACT 
e is such that 
the largest of 
{v - v , c , k} is 
v - v 
k 
c 
Value to 
Buyer 
a[v  - r - max{c ,k} ]  + (1 - d)[; - r]  
v - r 
v - r 
The marginal return to reliance when k or c is largest is the same 
under both schemes . However in Figure 12 the marginal return :to 
reliance is less when it is optimal for the buyer to receive the good . 
It is less to the extent that the seller can bargain away the rents 
associated with performance .  Since the return t o  reliance is smaller, 
the buyer relies less . 
Proposition 7: 
The function b ( • ,a)  achieves its supremum. Let N (a) 
be  the s et of all values for r such that b (• ,a) is maximized . Then 
(i) N (l) 
(ii) IJ (0) 
R 
{O } 
(iii) If a1 < a2 then sup N (a1) 2_ inf N (a2) .
(iv) If a1 < a2 then sup {f (r) : r  E N (a1) }  �inf { f (r) : r  E N (a2) }
(v)  N is an upper hemi continuous correspondence . 
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Proof:  
See Appendix. 0 
It is interesting to note that Proposition 7 does not 
depend on any concavity assumptions concerning v .  In particular, 
even though f may have numerous local maximums and non-concavities , 
as a. goes up , f (N(a.) )  also goes up (Proposition 7: iv) . The 
correspondence N "passes over" values of r such that f (r) is 
decreasing . The entire proof is driven by the assumption that 
v(r) - r is decreasing . See Lemma 3 in the Appendix for an explanation 
of the nature of the proof . This observation can be made about the 
succeeding propositions as well, but will only be made here for 
economy of presentation. 
D .  Behavior Under Expectation Damages 
The buyer always receives v (r) - r .  If the seller breaches 
the buyer simply receives a net of v(r) - r dollars . If the seller 
produces, he gives the good to the buyer if and only if v(r) - v(r) 
< k(6).  Otherwise h e  sells t o  a third party and pays the original 
I 
I 
buyer damages . Therefore, the buyer never has a resale opportunity 
and he receives v(r) - r if the contract is honored . Recall that 
the unique globai maximum to v (r)  - r occurs at r . The buyer clearlye 
chooses re under expectation damages . By Proposition 6, the
reliance choice of the buyer is generally larger than the 
efficient level of reliance . This observation was first made by 
Shavell (1978). The buyer is insured against both third party offers 
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and cost rises which render performance inefficient . Even though 
there is no social return to reliance in these cases , the buyer 
receives a private return to this reliance . Not surprisingly, 
the buy�r thus over-relies . 
E.  Behavior under Reliance Damages -- No Post-Contract Negotiations 
The buyer receives 
max{v(r) - r - p ,  k(6) + v(r) - r - p }  (24) 
if the seller honors the contract , since the buyer has the option 
of reselling to a third party , and O if the seller breaches .  The 
seller receives 
P - c (6 )  (25) 
if he honors the contract , 
k(6) - c (6 )  - r + -;(r) (26) 
if he sells to a third party, and 
-r + v(r) (27) 
if he does not produce . 
Now consider the following three expressions : 
p + r - v(r) (28) 
2 7  
c (8 ) (29)  
k(8 ) (30) 
From the above, the seller honors the contract if (28) is the largest 
of the three; he does not produce if (29) is the largest of the three ; 
he sells to the third party if (30 )  is the largest of the three . 
If two or more of the terms are tied for largest ,  he is indifferent 
between the actions associated with them. I will assume that if {28) 
is involved in a tie for the largest, the seller honor s .  If  (29)  
and (30 )  are tied for the largest,  I will assume that the seller 
sells to the third party . Let H(r , p )  be all values of 8 such that 
the seller honors the contrac t .  Let B1 (r , p) be the values such that
the seller sells to the third party and let B2 (r , p )  be the values such
that the seller does not produce. Let B (r , p)  � B1 Cr , p )  U B2 Cr , p ) . 
If v (r )  
Now suppose that v (r )  > p + r .  Then it i s  clear that 
p + r ,  then 
H(r ,p)  � Pt (r) 
B1 (r , p )  2 P� (r ) 
I I 
B2 (r , p )  2 P3 (r) . 
H(r , p )  
Bl (r , p )
B (r , p) 2 
Pt (r)
P� (r)
P3 (r) . 
(31)  
(32) 
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If v(r)  < p + r, then 
H(r , p) 2 Pt (r ) 
B1 Cr , p) � P� (r)
B2 (r , p )  � Pt (r ) (33) 
That is, if the buyer makes a profit from relying and receiving 
the good,  the seller does not give the good to him often enough. 
If the buyer makes zero profits from relying and receiving the goo d ,  
the seller acts efficiently . If the buyer makes negative profits 
from relying and receiving the good ,  then the seller honors the 
contract more often than is efficient . 
In the following paragraph I show that the buyer will
never choose an r and p such that v (r )  - r - p < O, because if this
is true then the buyer makes at best expected profits of zero and 
generally makes negative expected profit s .  Suppose that v (r )  - r - p 
< 0 .  Then if 8 E H(r , p) , we also know that k(8) + -; (r)  - r - p 
< 0 so that the buyer at best makes zero profits .  If  8 E B1 (r , p )  U 
B2 Cr , p )  the buyer makes zero profit s .  Therefore the buyer
makes at best zero profits and there is no incentive for him to 
have entered the contract . 
Because of the observation in the last paragraph, it is 
reasonable to assume that at the value of p chosen by the buyer 
and seller the set of values for r such that v (r )  - r - p � 0 is 
nonempty. By the above, the buyer also chooses his reliance level 
fr©1!1 this set.  The buyer ' s  expected return to reliance is 
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J 
max{v(r) - r - p , k(9)  + v (r) - r - p}dA 
H(r , p )  
+ f OdA 
B (r , p) 
(34 ) 
However, if 9 E H{r, p ) , then k(9)  + � (r) - r - p :::_ 0 ,  because (30 )  
i s  less than o r  equal to (28) . Therefore , w e  can rewrite ( 34 )  as
a(r ,p)  c J v(r)  - r - pdA 
H(r , p) 
over the domain where (34) is non-negative. As well ,  (34 ) is 
(35) 
negative if and only if (35)  is negative . Therefore r* maximizes 
(34) if and only if r* maximizes (35) .  
The deduction that the buyer chooses r t o  maximize 
a ( r , p) allows the fairly immediate conclusion that the buyer ' s  choice 
of reliance will  be at least as large in this case as for the case 
of expectation damages . The buyer receives v(r) - r - p when the 
s eller honors ,  just as in the expectation case .  However , now the 
buyer receives nothing if the seller breaches . Therefore he has 
an incentive to choose a larger r to encourage the seller to honor 
I I 
more often . Analogously to the previous propositions , because of 
the generality of the assumptions the formal statement of the propo-
sition allows the possibility that the reliance choice under reliance 
damages will equal that under expectation damages. However , 
this will only happen in special cases such as where v(r)  - r has 
a large "kink. "  Generally, the reliance choice under reliance 
damages will be larger . 
Proposition 8 (Shavell) :
Suppose that there exists an r such that v (r)  - r - p .'.'._ 0 .  Let 
A (p) be the set of values of r which maximize a (r , p) . Then 
Proof : 
(i) r E A (p )  *r .'.'._re for every p .
(ii ) If there exists an r such that v (r) - r < 0 for 
every r .:::_ r, then A(p)  � 0 for every p: 
See Appe�dix. 
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Using expressions (31 ) - ( 33)  and the fact that v(r) - r - p 
> 0 at the chosen level o f  reliance , the seller's choices are biased 
away from efficiency at the given level of reliance in the following 
fashion . The seller will sometimes not produce when it would have 
been more efficient to produce and honor the contract. He will 
sometimes produce and sell to the third party when it would have 
been more efficient to honor the contract.  However , he produces 
and s ells to a third_ party if and only if this is more efficient 
than not producing. Therefore the efficiency of reliance level r 
is less than or equal to f (r) , which is the efficiency achieved 
if the seller and buyer act optimally given the reliance level r .  
To show that the institution of reliance damages is no more efficient 
than that of expectation damages , it is thus sufficient to show 
that 
f ( r ) > sup{ f (r) : r E A (r)} . e -
3l 
(36)  
However, this is  automatically true'by Proposition 6 since r E A (p) 
implies that r .'.'.._re . 
Proposition 9 ( Shavell) : 
Under the assumption o f  no post-contract negotiations , 
the institution of reliance damages is no more efficient than that 
of expectation damages . 
Proof : 
As above . 0 
F. Behavior under Reliance Damages -- Post-Contract Negotiations 
In the last section the buyer assumed that the seller ' s  
breach behavior would not b e  efficient at the given level of reliance .  
To maximize his own return the seller sometimes does not honor the 
contract when doing so would actually increase the joint return of 
the buyer and seller . In this situ*tion the potential exists for 
the buyer and seller to negotiate a side payment from the buyer to 
the seller in return for the seller honoring the contract . I call 
these negotiations "post-contract negotiations . "  The most interesting 
effect of these negotiations for this analysis is that the relier 
takes them into account when making his reliance decision, and in 
general this changes his reliance decision . 
It is once again possible to show that if v(r) - r - p < 0 
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the buyer makes at best zero expected profits and generally makes 
negative expected profits . I will not present the proof since it 
is essentially the same as the analogous proof in section E. As 
in section E, I assume that at the value of p chosen by the buyer
and seller there exists an r such that v(r) - r - p � 0 .  The buyer 
always chooses an r such that v(r) - r - p � 0 .  The expected 
return to reliance over this domain is 
a*( r , p ,a. ) J v(r)  - r - pdA H(r ,p)  
+ a. J v (r) - -v(r)- - k(6) d). , Pf (r)nB1( r , p) 
+ a. I v(r) - v (r)  - c (6 ) dA P! (r)nB2 ( r , p )
( 37 )  
The return t o  reliance under no post-contract negotiations , 
(35) , differs from ( 37)  in that (37) has the extra term 
a. I v(r)  - v(r)  - k(6 ) dA Pf (r)nB1 ( r , p )
+ a. I v(r)  - v(r)  - c (6)�A .  P� (r)nB2 (r , p) 
The marginal return to increased reliance from this extra term may 
be positive or negative and as a consequence it cannot be stated 
in general whether reliance under post-contract negotiation is 
smaller or larger than reliance under no post-contract negotiations . 
However one observation can be made.  Reliance is  still at  least 
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as large as re . Shavell's original observation that reliance damages
produce an overly large reliance decision under no post-contract 
negotiations thus generalizes to 1the case of post-contract negotiations . 
By Proposition 6, therefore, reliance damages under post-contract 
negotiations produce a less efficient outcome than expectation 
damages . The intuition for this result is similar to that for 
Proposition 8 .  The relier has an incentive t o  over-rely i n  order to 
force the producer to honor the contract . 
Proposition 10:  
Suppose that there exists an r such that v (r) - r - p � 0. 
Let A*( p , a) be the values of r which maximize a* (• , p ,a). Then 
(i) r E A*( p , a) =>r > re for every ( p ,a) . 
( ii) If  v ( r) - r - p is eventually negative for all 
large enough values of r, then A *( p , a) # 0 for every ( p , a) . 
( iii) Therefore under post-contract negotiations , 
reliance damages are less efficient than expectation damages . 
Proof : 
See Appendix . 0 
G. Behavior under Res titution Damages -- No Post-Contract Negotiations 
Under restitution damages the seller pays expectation 
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damages if he elects to sell to no one . However ,  if he elects to 
s ell to a third party he pays the maximum of k - p and expectation 
damages . The seller, therefore, never has an incentive to sell to 
a third party . At bes t ,  he is indifferent between this option 
and performing . Since the buyer also receives the same return 
regardless , I will assume for analytical simplicity that the seller 
nev er sells to a third party . It is easy to see that the seller 
produces and honors the contract if and only if c .5_ v (r) - :; (r) . 
Therefore the buyer ' s  expected return to reliance can be written 
e ( r , p) le 
+ ke 
c (8 )  
ma·J v (r) } 
2. v (r)  - v (r)}
.1<lk(8)  + ; (r) - r � pd.A 
v (r) - r - pdA . 
c (8 )  > v (r) - v(r) } 
(38) 
Comparison of (38) with the expected return to reliance 
under expectation damages reveals that the reliance choice-under 
restitution damages is less than or equal to the reliance choice 
.under the other institution. This is because the buyer is only 
partially insured against the fact that it may be irore efficient 
for a third party to receive the good.  When k > v (r) - v(r) and 
v (r)  - v (r) > c ,  the buyer receives the good and resells it to the 
third party. Thus there is a chance that his reliance will have 
no return and the buyer takes this into account when he makes his 
reliance decision. Proposition 11 formally states this resul t .  
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Proposition 11: 
The function e(r,p) achieves its supremum and it does 
so independently of p. Let E be the set of all values of r which 
maximize e. Then 
sup E 2 re (39 ) 
Proof: 
See Appendix. D 
H. Behavior under Restitution Damages -- Post-Contract Negotiations 
The breach inefficiency in restitution damages is that when 
k > c > v(r) - v(r), the seller does not produce even though it 
is efficient to do so. Therefore, we would expect negotiations to 
determine a side payment from the buyer to the seller and the 
seller to produce in this case. The expected return to reliance 
for the buyer is then 
e*(r,p,a) = 1 
{ e. 
+ 
J{6 
_ I �x{ v(r)_ 
} 
c(8) :: v(r) _ v(r)} · 
k(8) - v(r) - r - pdA 
I.Cr) - r - p 
c(8) > v(r) - -;(r)}f 
+ a max{O,k(6) - c(6)}}dA 
This can be immediately rewritten as 
(40) 
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e*(r,p,a) e(r,p) 
+a I {8 k(8) > c(8) > v(r) - v(r)}k(8) - c(S)dA. (41) 
When a is zero the buyer expects to receive no rents from negotiations 
and he views the situation as identical to one where no post-contract 
negotiations occur. As a grows the buyer has less incentive to 
over-rely in order to force the seller to honor more often. This 
is because the buyer expects to do fairly well even when the seller 
breaches. Not surprisingly, therefore, the buyer's reliance decision 
grows smaller and more efficient as the value of a increases. 
Proposition 12 formally states this result. 
Proposition 12: 
The function e*(r,p,a) achieves its supremum over r for 
every p and a, and this is done independently of p. Let E*(a) 
denote the set of values for r which maximize e*(r,p,a). Let a1 < 
a2
, r1 E E*Ca1), and r2 E E*Ca2). Then 
(i) E*(O) = E. 
(ii) sup E*(a2) _::sup E*Ca1) and inf E*Ca2) _:: inf E*Ca1). 
(iii) A larger value of a results in at least as efficient an 
outcome. That is, f(r1) _:: f(r2). 
(iv) E is upper hemi continuous. 
Proof: 
See Appendix. D 
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I Behavior under Ideal Restitution Damages 
Under ideal restitution damages the breaching seller pays 
the buyer 
max{k - p,v(r) - v(r) - p}. (42) 
Ideal restitution damages thus protect the buyer's expectation under 
the assumption that the buyer would have sold to the third party if 
this was profitable. The buyer's return to reliance is thus 
m(r,p) = .J'emax{k(8) + ;(r) - r - p,v(r) - r -p}dA. 
Figures 3 and 4 diagram the nature of the buyer's return to to 
reliance under both types of restitution damages. 
FIGURE 3 
BUYER'S RETURN TO RELIANCE UNDER 
RESTITUTION DAMAGES -- POST-CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
e is such that Value to
the largest of Buyer 
{v - v,c,k} is 
I I I 
v - v v - r - p 
c ma� v -} - r - pk + v 
k, and v - v � c k +v - r - p  
and c > v - v v - r - p + a (k - c) 
(43) 
FIGURE 4 
BUYER'S RETURN TO RELIANCE UNDER
IDEAL RESTITUTION DAMAGES 
e is such that Value to
the largest of Buyer 
{v - v,c,k} is 
-
v - v v - r - p 
c max{ v -} - r - pk+v 
k k+v - r -p 
38 
The only difference between the two is the returns when k > c > v -v. 
In this case, reliance is valuable to the buyer operating under 
restitution damages because it increases his return in the absence 
of cooperation and thus increases his negotiation strength. Under 
ideal restitution damages the buyer is already assigned the property 
right to third party sales and there is no incentive for the buyer 
to attempt to increase his negotiation strength. The extra marginal 
return in the former case means that reliance is higher. 
Recall that under expectation damages the buyer receives 
a return to his reliance even when the seller sells to a thrid party. 
This is because the buyer's damage award, v(r) -;(r) - p, is an 
increasing function of r. However, there is no joint return to the 
buyer's reliance when the seller sells to a third party; the reliance 
is simply sold for scrap. This divergence between the private and 
joint evaluation of the marginal return to reliance contributes to 
the buyer's over-investment in reliance relative to the level which 
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maximizes joint profits. Imposition of ideal restitution damages 
amounts to a full correction of this divergence between the marginal 
private and joint return to reliarlce. Under _ideal restitution damages 
the buyer's damages depend on the price paid by the third party, 
k(6), instead of v(r). Since k does not depend on r, the buyer's marginal 
return to reliance now equals the marginal joint return. Therefore it 
is not surprising that ideal restitution damages result in a smaller 
and more efficient level of reliance than expectation damages. It 
is easy to see that ordinary restitution damages produce a partial 
correction for this divergence and that the correction increases with 
a. Therefore ordinary restitution damages produce reliance decisions
midway between the other two, with the decision becoming closer to 
that of ideal restitution damages as a grows larger. 
Recall that under expectation damages there is also a 
second contributor to an overly large reliance decision. In the 
case where cost rises dictate that the seller not produce at all, 
the buyer still receives a return to his reliance from the damage 
award. However, there is no joint return to reliance in this case. 
This distortion persists under id�ai restitution damages, as is 
clear from Figure 4. Therefore, even ideal restitution damages 
produce a reliance decision larger than that which maximizes joint 
profits. Although it removes the distortion associated with third 
party offers, it does not affect the distortion associated with 
cost increases. This suggests, and it is in fact easy to show, that 
in a world where third party offers do not occur, ideal restitution, 
restitution and expectation damages are equivalent. The next two 
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sections will show that specific performance begins where restitution 
damages leave off. Specific performance alFays produces a full 
correction of the third party offer distortion, and as a grows it 
also corrects progressively for the cost rise distortion so that when a
equals 1, specific performance produces an efficient reliance decision. 
Proposition 13 summarizes ideal restitution damages' properties. 
Proposition 13:
The function m(r,p) achieves its supremum independently 
of p. Let M be the values of r such that m achieves its supremum. 
Then 
inf R < inf M and sup R 2_ sup M 
sup M 2_ sup E*(l) and inf M < inf E*(l) 
Proof: 
See Appendix. 
J. Specific Performance -- No Post-Contract Negotiations 
(44) 
(45) 
0 
The damage remedy producing the most efficient reliance 
decision thus far, ideal restitution damages, is probably not 
implementable due to the court's inability to determine the value 
of k in the absence of a transaction occurring. Fortunately, specific 
performance will be seen to produce the identical incentives relating 
to the buyer's reliance decision as ideal restitution damages. In 
the next section it will be seen that specific performance induces 
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an even more efficient reliance decision to the extent that the 
buyer believes he will capture rents from post-contract negotiations . 
The buyer now always rec�ives the good. His expected 
return to reliance is thus 
s(r, p) = � _ v(r) - r - pdA
v(r) - v(r) > k(8) 
+ 1 _ k (8) + v(r) - r - pdA v(r) - v(r) < k(8) (45)  
Since he always receives the good his return is simply the maximum 
of the return he can receive by using it himself or selling to the 
third party. This is exactly what the seller receives under ideal 
restitution damages. That is, s(r,p) = m(r, p). Therefore reliance 
choice under both institutions is the same. Let S be the maximizing 
choices of s(r,p). We have proven 
Proposition 14:
s 
Proof: 
As above. 
� I 
K. . Specific Performance -- Post-Contract Negotiations 
D 
The inefficiency given reliance of specific performance is 
that the good is always produced, even when cost rises dictate that 
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joint profits would be maximized by no production. Post-contract 
negotiations might be expected to resolve such a situation. The 
seller could offer the buyer a side payment in lieu of performance 
which would render them both better off. As usual, the buyer' s  
expectations of the size of this side payment affect his expected 
return to reliance and thus his reliance decision. Once again a is 
the fraction of the increased joint profits that the buyer expects 
to receive. Figure 5 diagrams the buyer ' s  expected return to reliance. 
FIGURE 5 
BUYER' S  RETURN TO RELIANCE UNDER 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE -- POST-CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
8 is such that
the largest of
{v - v, c,k}  is
v - v 
k 
c 
Value to
Buyer 
max{v - ;,k} - r - p 
max{v - v, k} - r - p 
(1 - a) [max{v - v,k} - r - p ] 
+ a[c + v - r - p ]  
As a grows larger, the nuyer ' s  returns when costs increa�es 
make production unprofitable begin to depend more on the rents 
he can negotiate from the seller in exchange for allowing him out of 
the contract. Mathematically, this means that his returns in this 
case begin to depend less and less on his own reliance choice and 
more on the size of the seller ' s  cost over-run. From Figure 1 it is 
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is clear that this is also the case for the j oint return to reliance . 
In fact, when a equals 1, it is clear from comparing the two figures 
that the returns only differ by a co�stant , p - c (e) . Therefore 
the same choices �f r maximize the aggregate return as the buyer ' s  
return under specific performance when a equals 1 .  That is,  the 
buyer ' s  choice of reliance maximizes j o int profits in this cas e .  
As explained in Section I ,  expectation damages produces 
an over-investment in reliance beaause the buyer receives a return 
to his reliance when it is efficient for a third party to receive the 
good or for the good not to be produced at all even though the buyer ' s  
reliance is not used in these cases and therefore does not increase 
j oint profits . Therefore, � ante , the buyer over-values reliance 
and over-invests in it . 
Ideal restitution damages and specific performance when a 
is zero amount to a complete correction of the divergence between 
the private and j oint returns to reliance for the case where the 
efficient course of action is for the third party to receive the 
good.  As a grows larger , specific performance progressively corrects 
for the other distortion as well,  so 1that when a equals 1, specific 
I 
performance produces a perfectly efficient reliance decision. The 
buyer makes a more efficient decision as a grows because he expects 
to receive more and more of the gains from an efficient decision 
on his part . 
The buyer ' s  return to reliance in this case is 
s* (r , p ,a) = f  v (r) - r - pd>.. +f k(e)  + v(r) - r - pd>.. Pf (r) P! (r) 
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+ f {v(r) - r - p + ac(e)  + (1 - a) max{k (8 ) , v(r) - v(r) }}dA . (46 )
P*(r) 3 
Proposition 15 summarizes the properties of s* . 
Proposition 15 : 
The function s* ( • , p ,a) achieves its supremum independently 
of p .  Let S* (a) denote the set of values which maximize s* ( • , p , a) . 
Let a1 < a2 . Then 
(i) S* (O) s .
(ii) S* (l) R.
(iii) inf S* (a2) � inf S* (a1) and sup S* (a2) � sup S* (a1) . 
( iv) Higher values o f  a produee m6re efficient outcomes . That is,  
if ri E S* (ai) '  then f (r2) � f (r1) .
(v) S* is upper hemi continuous . 
Proof:  
See Appendix. 
L. Liquidated Damages 
0 
The optimality of specific performance depends on post-
contract negotiations successfully occurring and for the buyer to 
believe he will be successful in capturing most of the rents up for 
negotiation. Furthermore, we have not considered the transactions 
costs of these negotiations or the effects of the ex ante increase 
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in risk created by relying on the outcome of post-contract negotiations . 
For these reasons it may well be that damage institutions not relying 
on post-contract negotiations are generally superior to those that do . 
It is easy, for example, to create examples where agents averse to 
the risk of post-contract negotiations prefer expectation damages to 
specific performance . 
Proposition 16: 
Agents averse to the risk of negotiations may prefer 
expectation damages to specific performance .  
Proof :  
See Appendix. D 
Fortunately, a damage measure does exist which induces 
efficient reliance on the part of the buyer but does not require 
post-contract negotiations . The buyer and seller can insert a value 
o f  lump-sum damages to be paid by the seller to the buyer in the 
event o f  breach which results in a� �fficient reliance choice by the 
buyer and an efficient breach decision by the seller . 
Proposition 17 :  
Let r* b e  any element of R .  Then a liquidated damages 
award of v(r*) - v(r*) - p induces a reliance choice in R for the 
buyer and an efficient breach choice for the seller . 
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Proo f :  
See Appendix. D 
The intuition is clear . Expectation damages , v (r) - v(r) - p ,  
produce efficient breach behavior at r .  A s  long a s  the buyer chooses 
r*, the seller thus exhibits efficient breach behavior . The buyer 
now chooses an efficient level of reliance because the damages he 
receives in the event of breach do not depend on his own level of 
reliance . 
Since the buyer and seller can maximize their ex � j oint 
return by choos ing liquidated damages o f  v ( r*) - v(r*) - p ,  presumably 
they would do so . This raises the question of why all contracts do 
not incorporate liquidated damages . Firs t ,  the amount o f  reliance 
at stake may not always be large enough to be significant . Second, 
courts do not always enforce liquidated damages clauses (Goetz and 
Scott ,  1977) . Third, and possibly most important , however , v may b e  
random. That is , v may be a funct ion of 8 a s  well . In this case,  
it is easy to prove that liquidated damages of v(r*, 8 ) - v(r*, 0 )  · - ·p 
induce efficient behavior,  but now contracts must specify an entire 
function instead of one number . Furthermore, various moral hazard 
problems are raised if 8 is not observable.  Therefore , as v becomes 
more variable, liquidated damages becomes a less satisfactory damage 
measure . This theory predicts that in cases where the cost  of 
inefficient reliance is significant and v is not too variable , 
liquidated damages would be used.  
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M .  Summary 
Figure 6 provides a graphical summary of the results of the 
case where no market for substituse performance exists . 
FIGURE 6 
SUMMARY -- NO MARKET FOR SUBSTITUTE PERFORMANCE 
1.&-�����.,.....�����:!l-..,,;-""*"-L-""""....,1.__.._..._-rc-....... _.���r 
I No contract I Reliance
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r 
l
e 
expectation damages 
restitution damages 
ideal restitution damages 
specific performance 
liquidated damages 
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Four points should be noted . First , the intervals for some 
damage measures occur because post-contract negotiations occur to 
resolve inefficient breach behavior at the given level of reliance . 
Each point in the interval corresponds to the buyer ' s  reliance choice 
under a different value for his subj ective negotiation strength , a .
For no  contract , specific performance ,  and restitution damages,  the 
reliance choice moves towards R and becomes more efficient as a grows . 
Second , because the intervals are all disj oint, we get an unambiguous 
ranking of the institutions even if a different value for a is used 
for different institutions . Third , some of the endpoints of intervals 
may be shared and some intervals may collapse in degenerate situations . 
For example , when there are no third party offers the entire restitution 
damages interval collapses into re . Fourth, f is drawn as concave in 
Figure 6 .  In fact ,  f i s  not necessarily concave . The original work 
in this area (Shavell 1978) assumed that v was concave and then asserted 
this implied f was also concave . This assertion was false . All the 
results we would expect were f concave are instead proven on the 
basis of dividing the obj ective functions into non-decreasing and non-
increasing parts .  See Lemmas 3 ,  4 ,  and 5 in particular . Since all 
the theorems that would be true were f concave are true , it is 
convenient to draw f as being concave . 
V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
A number of factors were not considered which may affect 
the nature of the conclusions . The purpose of this section is to 
take note of some of these and speculate on their effects , suggesting 
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directions for future research. 
First ,  the different damage measures allocate risk differently. 
For example ,  restitution damages ptaces the risk of third party offers
on the buyer; expectation damages places this risk on the seller . 
Differential attitudes towards risk might therefore affect choice of 
a damage measure . 
Second , the buyer and seller may possess different 
subj ective evaluations of the likelihood of various outcomes o f  
8 .  Therefore, for example ,  the agent who thought a particular risk 
had less variance might be more willing to bear it . An important 
example concerns the case where the buyer has very little knowledge 
of e at all ,  but the seller has good information on e and knows 
he will in all likelihood honor the contract.  To the seller there 
is little cost in agreeing to specific performance; to the buyer 
there is a large benefit,  especially if the buyer would have to 
incur search costs in the event of breach . (Search costs are typically 
not included in expectation damages . )  In some sense , by agreeing to 
specific performance the seller is co1!Dllunicating to the buyer that 
breach is unlikely. I I I 
Third, it was assumed that both parties could equally well 
resell the good to the third party . It may well be ,  however, that the 
seller has an advantage in selling to third parties because of fixed 
costs such as a showroom, repair services , reputation, etc . Therefore 
damage measures which tran�fer the property right to third party sales 
to the buyer (specific performance , ideal restitution damages ,  and 
restitution damages) might well involve a post-contract negotiation 
s:o 
transferring this property right back to the seller in the event of 
a large third party offer . Post-contract negotiations result in 
extra risk and transactions costs . 
Fourth, search may be required to ferret out third party 
offers . If,  as seems likely, the seller is the efficient searcher, 
transfer of the property right to third party sales to the buyer 
would result in too little search occurring . 
This transfer of the property right to third party offers 
has been taken note of in the literature on specific performance 
(Kronman 1978 ;  Schwartz 1979) . Kronman attempted to argue that 
specific performance would be typically more desired for unique goods 
on the basis of the first point above . Schwartz pointed out that 
Kronman' s  speculations were not correct .  I t  i s  true that specific 
performance is equivalent to expectation damages when a market for 
substitute performance exists ,  and is thus not necessary. Within 
the class of goods for which no market for substitute performance 
exists, the second point above suggests a type of good for which 
specific performance might be desirable . However ,  the third and 
fourth points above suggest types o f  goods for which specific 
performance would be undesirable . Therefore , although the absence 
of a market for substitute performance is necessary for specific 
performance to be useful , it is by no means sufficient . 
Fifth, when damage measures produce inefficient breach 
behavior at the given reliance level and depend on post-contract 
negotiations to resolve this , transactions costs or aversion to the 
risk of negotiations may produce an advantage for damage measures 
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which do induce efficient breach behavior .  See Proposition 1 6  and 
the discussion surrounding it . 
A sixth, related point is1 that the choice of an efficient
level of reliance requires knowledge of k(8 )  and c (e) .  The damage 
measures which outperform expectation damages require the buyer to 
possess progressively more information as the reliance decision 
becomes progressively more efficient . For example, under restitution 
damages the buyer must know k(8 ) to calculate his optimal level of 
reliance;  under specific performance he must know k (8 ) and c (9 ) . 
Therefore an implicit assumption in the conclusion that various 
measures outperform expectation damages is that the buyer has the 
information to make an optimal reliance choice . In a situation 
where the buyer has no knowledge of c (S)  or k(S) , the institution 
of expectation damages which requires that the buyer only know his 
own private information, v (r) , may produce the same reliance decision 
as institutions which outperform it under conditions of fuller 
information. Points five and six may help explain the prevalent use 
of expectation damages in the courts .  The buyer often may not possess 
sufficient information for ohher inft�tutions to produce a better
reliance decision than expectation damages and expectation damages 
results in no post-contract negotiations . 
Seventh, much less litigation may be involved in enforcing 
some damage measures than others . When the good or service contracted 
for is difficult to monitor , specific performance may be very 
expensive to enforce.  Often, expensive litigation will be required 
to determine the value of the award under expectation damages .  
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Possibly liquidated damages involves the smaller enforcement cost 
in the case where they do not depend on difficult to measure factors 
(i . e . , where v is not a function of a difficult to monitor 8 ) . 
Eighth, the courts often have difficulty in awarding 
"idiosyncratic" expectation damages . Even though a particular good 
or service may be worth well above the average value of such goods or 
services to a particular breachee, it is difficult to establish this 
and consequently expectation damages do not protect this "idiosyncratic" 
value . Liquidated damages or specific performance can do this.. This 
point has been made persuasively in the literature (Goetz and Scott 
1977) . 
VI . CONCLUSION 
When a market for substitute performance exist s ,  most  of 
the problems considered in this paper vanish . The relier needs no 
assurances of performance to rely efficiently . The institutions 
of expectation damages and specific performance produce no moral 
hazard and result in efficient allocation o f  resources . That is , 
society finds itself in the unfortunate position that the existence 
of a problem for the institution of contracts to solve is also 
sufficient to cause contracts to create their own inefficiency . 
This paper is an analysis of the capabilities of various contract 
institutions for coping with such a perverse market failure . 
The absence of a competitive market means that a party 
who engages in reliance in anticipation of a future exchange 
worsens his negotiating posit ion in the future negotiation over 
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p�ice of exchange. This results in less than efficient levels of 
reliance . Contracts "solve" this problem, but only at the cost 
of providing that the relier receive some private return from 
reliance even in cases where some exogenous happening renders 
exchange inefficient and the reliance has no social return. As 
with many other types of insurance, a moral hazard is created . 
In this case the relier tends to over-rely. 
Reliance damages result in the least efficient allocation 
of goods regardless of whether or not post-contract negotiat ions 
occur and regardless of the level of confidence the relier has 
concerning this negotiating strength. Restitution damages tend to 
produce a more efficient reliance choice than expectation damages 
because under the former the relier takes into account the fact that 
sales to a third party may make his reliance useless . Assuming that 
post-contract negotiations occur, specific performance is even more 
efficient . If the relier has absolutely no confidence in his negotiating 
s trength, his reliance choice is largest .  As his confidence grows he 
takes more and more account of the fact that rises in cost of production 
may render performance inefficient �nd thus he relies more efficiently . 
In the limit, as he expects to receive all the rent from any negotiaiton, 
his reliance decis ion is efficient . The buyer and seller can choose 
a level of liquidated damages,  which induces efficient behavior .  
The formal analysis o f  this paper highlights the crucial 
role of information in the process of contracting. Essentially, it 
seems that although other institutions may produce more efficient 
behavior than expectation damages,  the institution currently being 
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used, they require more information and/or negotiations . Under conditions 
of poor information, agents averse to the variance generated by poor 
information might well find that expectation damages are the most 
efficient contract institution. 
Current law frowns upon specific performance and liquidated 
damages clauses , often not enforcing such agreements ( Schwartz 1979 ; 
Goetz and Scott 1977) . The economists ' simple-minded statement that 
freedom of choice can only always make everyone better off is not 
sufficient to sway the courts.  They claim that the opportunity to 
insert such clauses in contracts often allows more exercise of monopoly 
power and other unfair bargaining power . This may well b e  and is worthy 
of analysis in itself .  Another line o f  counterargument is  to  identify 
specific reasons why parties to a contract might find it to their 
mutual advantage to insert such clauses into their contracts . This 
tactic has been followed by previous authors (Kronman 1978 ; Schwartz 
1979; Goetz and Scott 1977) . This paper adds another reason why 
parties to a contract may prefer specific performance or liquidated 
damages over more conventional remedies . 
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APPENDIX 
To prove Proposition 2 , �t is easiest to first establish 
two simple lemmas . 
Lemma 1 :  
Let S b e  a set.  Let h .  be a real valued function defined 
1 
on R x  S for i = l ,  • • •  , n .  Define h :  R x  S + R by 
h (x , s )  max {h . (x , s) } .
i E { l ,  • • •  ,n} 1 
(A-1) 
Suppose each hi is continuous - in its first variable uniformly over
its second variable. That is , for every i E { l ,  • • •  , n } ,  x E R  and0 
E > 0 there exists a o > 0 such that for every s E S and x E R 
I x  - x- 1 < o * l h .  (x , s )  - h . (x ,s)  I < E .0 1 1 0 
Then h is also continuous in its first variable uniformly over 
its second variable . 
Proof : 
(A-2) 
Choose any x0 E R and E > 0 .  Then there exists a o > 0 
such that for every i E { l ,  . • •  ,n} , s E S and x E R  
I x - x I <  o * l h . (x , s )  - h . (x , s) I < E .0 1 1 0 (A-3) 
Now let i*(x) and i** be the elements of {l, . . .  ,n}  which, respectively, 
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maximize hi(x, s)  and hi (x0 , s ) . Then 
l h (x, s)  - h(x , s ) I 0 l hi* (x) (x, s) - hi**(x0s) I (A-4) 
First suppose that hi* (x) (x, s )  - hi** (x0 , s) .:_ 0 .  Then it is less ·than 
or equal to hi* (x) (x, s )  - hi* (x) (x0 , s) which is less than E by (A-3) .
Second, suppose that hi*(x) (x,s)  - hi**(x0 , s )  < 0 .  Then it is less
than or equal to hi** (x, s) - hi** <,
x0 , s )  in absolute value which is
less than E in absolute value by (A-3) . 
Lemma 2 : 
Let S b e  a. measurable b ounded subset of Rn . Let h be a 
real valued function defined over R x S which is continuous in its 
first variable uniformly over its second variable and measurable 
in its second variable. Define g : R  + R by 
D 
g (x) J
s
h ( x , s ) d s .  (A-5) 
Then g is continuous . 
Proof:  
Then 
Choose any x0 E R and E > 0. Then s elect a o such that
I x  - x0 I < o * j h (x, s)  - h (x0 , s ) I < \ts) · (A-6) 
l g Cx) - g (xo) i  2 JS A.ts)  dA. e: . 
Proposition 2 
It is clear that f can be rewritten as 
v (r) - r - c (S)  
I 
� ;(r) - r + k ( S) - c (S)
f (r) = 2 max ?" dA. .  · [0 , 1 ]  v (r) - r - k ( S) 
V°(r) - r 
5 7  
(A-7) 
D 
(A-8) 
Each of the four functions in brackets is continuous in r uniformly 
over 8 .  Therefore by Lemma 1 ,  so is their maximum. Therefore 
by Lemma 2 f is continuous . 
The function V°(r) - r is always decreasing in r .  
Therefore, for r > re all four functions are larger at re than r .
Therefore s o  i s  f .  
Proposition 3 
Therefore f achieves its supremum on [ O , re ] . D 
It is clear that the buyer and seller act so that Pi = Pt (r) 
for i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 .  Therefore the buyer ' s  expected return as a function 
of r is 
b (r)  I v (r)  - r - k(S ) dA + f V°(r) P*(r)UP*(r) P* (r) UP* (r) 1 3 2 . 4 
- rdA. . 
(A-9) 
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Now rewrite b (r)  as 
r 
b(r)  f (r) + j c ( S )  - k ( S ) dA. . (A-10 ) 
Pt (r)UP! (r) 
However, Pf(r) U P! (r) equals 
{ ( 8 ) :  c (S) 2 k( S) }  (A-11) 
which does not depend on r. Therefore b (r) and f (r)  differ only 
by a constant, and they have the same maximizing values . 
Proposition 4 
It is clear that the buyer and seller will act so that 
D 
P .  l. Pt (r) for i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 .  Therefore the buyer ' s  expected return
as a function of r and p, the contract price, is 
e(r, p) = f v(r) - r - pdA. + f V°(r) - r + k(S)  - pdA. . 
Pf (r) UP� (r) P! (r)UPt (r) 
(A-12 ) 
Now rewrite e ( r , p) as 
e(r,p)  f (r) + f c (8) - ;dA + f k ( S )  - pdA . 
Pf (r) UP! (r) P� (r)UPt (r) 
(A-13) 
However , as in Proposition 3, Pf (r) U P! (r) does not vary with r .  
Neither does P� (r) U Pt (r) . Therefore e(r ,p)  differs from f (r)  by 
a constant . o 
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Lemma 3 is used to prove Proposition 7 • .  
Lemma 3: 
Let h and g be real valued functions defined on .R. Let 
g be decreasing. Choose a1 and a2 in (O , l ] . Let a1 > a2 • 
Suppos e  that ri maximizes
h(r)  + 
(:).. - a . )  
__ __ J.
ai 
g (r) (A-14) 
for i = 1 , 2 . Then r1 � r2 • Furthermore , if ai f 1 ,  then r < ri 
implies that h(r)  < h ( ri) .
Proof :  
( 1  - a1) 
al 
Suppose that r2 > r1 . Then g (r2) < g(r1) .(1 - a2) < a • Therefore we have 2 
As well 
[� a2 
- a2) (1 - a1)] [( l  - a2) (1 - a1)] --- g(r2) < - g(rl) . al a2 al 
I I I 
As well s ince r1 is a maximizing value of (A-14) for a1 , 
(1 - a1) (1 - a1) h(r2) + g(r2) .S. h(r1) + g(r1) al al 
Add (A-15) and (A-16) to yield 
(1 - a2) (1 - a2) h (r2) + g (r2) < h(r1) + a g(r1) a2 2 
which contradicts the definition of r . . 2 
(A-15 ) 
(A-16) 
(A-17 )  
Therefore r2 must be l ess  than or equal to r1 . 
For the last part , if r < ri , then the fact that g is
decreasing implies h ( r) < h(ri) .
Proposition 7 
Rewrite b ( r ,a) as 
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b (r , a) a(f (r)  + J{a 
c < 
c (8 )  - k(8 ) dA) + (1 - a) (v(r) - r)
k} 
D 
(A-18) 
by performing the required algebra. If a = 0 ,  N (a) clearly equals {O} . 
Therefore for any a f O ,  sup N (O)  < inf N (a) . Now consider the 
case where a f 0 .  Rewrite b as 
b ( r ,a) = a rf (r) + ( l  - a) (v(r) - r)  + f r a {8 c < c (8 )  - k ( 8 ) dA] k} 
(A-19 ) 
Since r > r implies f (r) < f (r ) ,  v(r) - r is decreasing, and sincee e 
b oth f (r) and v(r) - r are continuous ,  b (r ,a) achieves its supremum 
Lemma 3 now yields results ( iii) and ( iv) . Result (v) follows 
d irectly from a theorem in Debreau (1959 ) ,  page 1 . 9 .  D 
Proposition 8 
Rewrite equation (34 )  as 
a(r ,p)  (v (r) - r - p) A (H(r,p) ) . (A-20) 
For r < re ' v(r) - r - p < v(re) - re - p • .As well , A • H(• , p) 
is nondecreasing in r. Therefore, all of the global maxima to 
a(• , p) occur in [re ,00). 
For part (ii) it is sufficient to show that A • H - is 
upper semicontinuous in r. This is true because A • H(r , p) · is 
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actually F(p - v(r) + r,p - v(r) + r) where F is the distribution 
function of the random variables c and k. The function F is by 
definition nondecreasing and continuous from the right so is 
upper semicontinuous. 
Proposition 10 
Rewrite a*(r ,p , a) as follows 
a*(r ,p , a) a { v(r) -
JPf(r) 
f
r+ p 
}
max k(8) + =(r) dA
c(8) + v(r) 
0 
+ (1 - a) f v(r) ' - r - pdA. 
a(r , p) 
(A-21) 
I I I 
.As for Proposition 8 ,  both integrals are larger at re than at any 
r < re. Therefore this is also true for any convex combination 
of the two integrals. Consequently a*(• , p, a) is maximized on 
[re,oo) if at all. 
For existTnce, the second integral is an upper semicontinuous 
function of r as proved in Proposition 8 .  The first integral can 
be rewritten as 
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1 m
ax k(8) - =(r) - max k(8) + =(r) dA.
[0 , 1 ]  
lv(r) 
} {
r + p 
} 
c(8) + v(r) c(8) + v(r) (A-22) 
Now in much the same fashion as for Propositrion 2, it can be shown 
that (A-22) is a contiuous functions of 4 .  Therefore a* is an upper 
semicontinuous function of r for every (p , a). If v(r) - r - p is 
eventually negative for large enough r, it is clear that a*(r ,p , a) 
will also be negative for large enough r. .As a consequence , it must 
achieve its supremum somewhere. 0 
Pit>oposition 11 
Expression (39) is proven in the same fashion as the previous 
proofs, by dividing e into the function whose supremum occurs at 
tye bound and a function which is nondecreasing. Once (39) is proven, 
for existence it is sufficient to show that e is upper semicontinuous . 
This is done by the same type of argument as in Propositions 2 and 8 .
0 
Lemma 4 :
Let h and g be real valued functions defined on R .  Let g 
be nonincreasing. Choose a1 and a2 
in [O , l ]  with a1 < a2. Suppose 
that R .  is the set of values for r which maximize i 
h(r) + aig(r). 
(A-23) 
6 3  
Let ri E Ri · Then 
(i) sup R2 � sup R1 
(ii) inf R2 � inf R1 
(iii) r < ri implies h (r) � h (ri) .
Proo f :  
(i)  Suppose that there exists an r2 e: R2 such that r2 > sup R1 . 
Then consider any r1 e: R1 . We know that
h ( r1) + a1g (r1) > h(r2) + a1g (r2) 
because r2 > sup R1 • 
As well,  
(a2 - al) g (rl) � (a2 - al) g (r2) .
because g is in increasing and r2 > sup R1 . Adding (A-24) and
(A-25)  yields 
h (rl) + a2g(rl) > r <�2) + a2g(r2) ' 
(A-24) 
(A-25)  
(A-26 )  
contradicting the definition of r2 . Therefore , for every r2 e: R2 , 
r2 � sup R1 , or equivalently, sup R2 � sup R1 . 
(ii) This is proven in a similar fashion to (i) .  
(iii) The fact that g is non increasing means 
-a . g (r) < - a . g(r . ) .1 - 1 1 (A-27) 
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Also , since ri e: Ri ' 
h ( r) + aig(r) � h(ri) _ ai g(ri) . (A-
28) 
Addition of (A-27) and (A-28) yields 
h (r) � h (ri) . (A-
29)  
D 
Proposition 12 : 
Part (i) is obvious . Parts (ii)  and (iii) follow innnediately 
from Lemma 4 .  Existence o f  a maximum follows a s  usual from upper 
semicontinuity. 
Proposition 13 :  
Rewrite (43) as 
m(r , p) e* (r, l) + ./{c(8 )  - (v(r) - -:;_;:(r) ) } dA 
{8 : k > c > v - -:;_;:} (A-30) 
The above integrand is decreasing in r and non-negative . The region 
being integrated over shrinks as r increases . Therefore the integral 
D 
in (A-30)  is a non increasing function of r . From this, (45) is clear . 
m(r ,p) 
Now rewrite (43) as 
f (r) + c (8)  - p + �max(k(8) , v(r) - v (r) ) 
{8 : c (8) > k ( 8 )  A c ( 8) > v(r) - -;(r) } 
c (8 ) }dA 
(A-31) 
The integrand is negative and increases in r .  The domain o f  integration 
decreases with r .  Therefore , the integral is a ,non-decreasing 
function of r .  This proves (44) .  
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Existence and upper hemi-continuity is proved by the usual 
upper semicontinuity argument as in Proposition 7 .  Cl 
Lemma 5 :  
Let h and g b e  real valued functions defined on R . Let 
g be non decreasing. Choose a1 and a2 in [O , l ]  with a1 < a2 . Suppose
that Riis the set of values for r which maximize
h(r) + aig(r) . (A-3
2) 
Let ri E: Ri . Then 
(i) inf R1 � inf R2 
(ii) sup R1 � sup R2 
(iii) r > ri implies h (r) � h (ri) .
Proof : 
The proof is substantially the same as that of Lemma 4 .  o 
Proposition 15 : 
First rewrite s* (r, p , a) as 
s* (r , p , a) v(r)  - r - p + l v( r) - v(r) + k(8) dA. 
P� (r) 
+ ( v(r) - v (r) + c ( 8) + (1 - a) max{k( 8) ,v(r) - v(r) }dA, . 
)p�(r) 
(A-33) 
It is easy to see that both integrals are non-increasing functions of r .  
Therefore i f  s * achieves its supremum, i t  does so on [ O , re ] .  The
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usual proof of upper semicontinuity thus establishes existence and 
upper hemi-continuity of S* . 
Now rewrite s* (r , p , a) as 
s* (r , p , a) f (r) + 1 c (8)  - pdA. 
[0 , 1 ]  
+ ( 1  - a) r max{k(8) , v (r) - v(r)} - c (8) dA. . 
Jp� (r) 
(A-34 ) 
It is easy to see that the second integral is a non-decreasing function 
of r .  Cl 
Proposition 16:  
The proof of this proposition is a counterexample . Suppose 
that the buyer is averse to the risks of negotiations . Model this 
by assuming that although the buyer believes the expected value of his 
negotiating strength is such that a is a*, he uses a = � where � 
is less than a* to evaluate the desirability o f  any such gamble .  This 
is a type of certainty equivalence . In the limit the buyer may have 
no basis at all for forming an expected value . He might then exhib it 
maxi-min behavior, attempting to guarantee himself some minimum level 
of income even in the worst case . For the buyer this means choosing 
'\ = 0 .  To the extent that the buyer is averse to risks associated
with the negotiation process ,  he will choose � less than a* , the true 
value of a. 
I assume that the seller is risk neutral and that there are 
no third party offers . More general counterexamples can , of course , 
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be created, but since this is essentially a counterexample to the 
previous results, I select bhe simplest case . 
This example shows that tf the buyer is risk averse enough, 
expectation damages are actually more efficient than specific performance .  
The intuition behind this result i s  straight-forward . As the buyer 
becomes more risk averse , his reliance choice under specific performance 
becomes less and less superior to the reliance choice under expectation 
damages . That is , the advantage to specific performance declines . 
This fact alone would cause specific performance to be equally efficient 
to expectat ion damages in the limit . However,  ano ther factor is also 
at work, besides the reliance choice becoming less efficient . As well , 
the buyer begins to discount the expected return from negotiations . 
At some point these factors invariably combine to produce a larger 
efficiency gain for expectation damages . The formal statement is as 
follows . 
Formal Statement of Counterexample: 
Suppose that the buyer compares returns from specific 
performance to those from expectat�op damages by using a = ab . 
Let the actual value of a be a* . Suppose that there is a positive 
probability of cost overruns . That is,  
( c (8) dA > 0 .  
JPj (re) 
Then 
(i)  For every a* > 0 there exists an a� > 0 such that 
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Cii, < � implies that expectation damages are more efficient than 
specific performance . 
(ii) If a* = 0, then Cii, = 0 implies that expectation damages 
and specific performance are equally efficient.  
Proof:  
The seller evaluates the two returns by comparing their 
expected values . The buyer evaluates the �wo returns by comparing 
the certain return from expectation damages to the discounted expected 
return from specific performance . It is clear in this case that one 
institution is more efficient than the other if and only if the sum 
of the buyer ' s  and seller ' s  evaluations is greater . (A side payment 
is always possible such that the institution producing the greatest 
aggregate value will result in both parties being better off than under 
the second institution. )  Therefore it is sufficient to show that the 
sum of evaluations from expectation damages is less than that from 
specific performance .  The former number is f (re) .  The latter is
S* (rs , p , Cii, ) + f ( rs ) - S* (rs , p , a*) (A-3'.i ) 
where rs is the element of S *(Cii, ) chosen by the buyer . Let G (Cii,)
be the s et of all possible values for (A-35 ) .  
G (Cii,) {S*(r , p , ab) + f (r ) - S *(r , p , a*) : r E S*(a... ) } .s s s s b (A-36)  
Let g (Cii, ) be the supremum of G(Cii, ) . 
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g (ab) sup G (�) . (A-37 )  
It i s  easy t o  observe that g (O) e�uals f (re) when a*  = 0 and is
less than f (re) when a* > 0. Therefore ( ii)  is proven . To prove
( i) we must show that g is upper semicontinuous .  This follows 
from a theorem in Debreu (Debreu 1959 ) , page 1 . 9 .  
Proposition 1 7 :  
First consider the seller . The seller receives p - c (6) 
if he performs , k(6) - c (6) - v(r*) + � (r*) + p if he sells to a 
third party, and -v(r*) + v(r*) + p if he breaches . The seller ' s  
D 
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l(r, p)  = F (r ,Pt (r*) , P� (r*) ,P) (r*) )
+ J c (6) - pd\ + f d + c ( 6)
Pt (r*) p� (r*) 
- k(6 )d\ + J d d\.  
p3 (r*)
(A-39) 
None of the integrals are functions of r. Therefore l and F di°ffer 
only by a constant and are maximized by the same values of r. To 
see that l and F are maximized at r ,  suppose they are not ,  for 
contradiction. Then there exists an r' such that 
F(r' , Pt (r*) , P� (r*) ,P�(r*) ) > F (r*, Pt (r*) , P� (r*) ,P� (r*) ) .
(A-40 )  
breach decision i s  therefore a s  follows : By definition, 
e is such that 
the largest of 
{v(r*) - v(r*) ,k(6) , c (6) } 
is 
v(r*) - �(r*) 
k(6) 
c(6) 
The seller 
honors contract 
sells to third party 
does not produce 
Now consider the buyer . Let d be the damages . Then the buyer ' s  return 
to reliance is 
l(r ,p)  = J v (r) - r - p d\ + l d + v(r) - r d\ . 
Pt (r*) P� (r*) U P) (r*)
(A-38) 
Rewrite this as 
F (r' ,Pf(r ' ) , P� (r ' ) , P� (r ' ) )  � F (r ' , Pf (r*) ,P� (r*) , P) (r*) ) . 
(A-41) 
Combining (A-40) and (A-41) yields 
F(r' ,Pf (r') ,P� (r') ,P) (r') ) > F (r* ,Pf (r*) ,P� (r*) , P)(r*) ) . 
(A-42) 
Therefore any value of r chosen by the buyer results in the maximization 
of joint returns . Cl 
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